I n debates about the merits of public intervention to address issues of persistent poverty, two distinct tensions emerge: needs versus assets and people versus place. The former poses a philosophical dilemma about considerations for providing governmental assistance and whether or not policy makers should pay equal attention to communities' assets as well as needs. The latter, however, questions targeting; ought government have obligations toward "place" as an indirect means to the welfare of individuals (direct targeting)?
individuals (or families), including food stamps and health care, regardless of where they live. Conversely, the latter view sees "place targeting" (Snow 1995) , that is, urban renewal, public housing, or enterprise zones, as integral to people prosperity. However, neither approach adequately captures the complexities and nuances of the targeted population. Furthermore, the inefficiencies of these two approaches are well documented (Jacobs 1961; Gans 1968; Marris 1974; Katzman 1982; Frieden and Sagalyn 1989; Kaplan 1990; Nathan 1992; Lemann 1994; Levitan and Miller 1995; Gale 1996) .
Proponents of efficiency and equity maintain that the benefits of place-oriented interventions typically accrue to the wrong people, that is, landlords (Edel 1980; Lemann 1994) , or limit the opportunities of the beneficiaries who must remain living in targeted areas (Gale 1996, 192) for continued assistance. Critics of people-oriented policies criticize entitlement on the grounds that these policies perpetuate the culture of welfare dependency (Mead 1986 ). However, those who plead for "individual" targeting consider "accurate" area targeting nearly impossible (Katzman 1982) . Supporters of peopleoriented policies generally question the effectiveness of area targeting as a "highly politicized" process. They further argue that policy makers are unable to articulate clear-cut criteria for eligible locations. The proponents of people-oriented policy making also argue for the inseparability of the poor and the nonpoor in distressed areas.
Indeed, the past three decades have witnessed a shift in policy making. The "crisis of confidence" (Moynihan 1967 ) associated with the failure of public policy to fulfill its promises, the increasing government cutbacks on aids to localities, as well as government's decreased responsibility for inner-city programs has prompted this shift. The federal devolution in the past two decades, coupled with the growing reliance of communities on self-help and redevelopment finance innovations (Sviridoff 1994) , has shifted the attention from addressing "needs" alone to "capacity building" based on community "assets" and "empowerment." These often used but less defined terms commonly purport gaining control of resources through ownership, (financial) management, networking, or access to government (Peterman 2000) . The importance of "the ghetto as a resource" (Goldsmith 1974) , the resurgence of the theory of social capital (Jacobs 1961; Coleman 1988; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993; Wallis 1998; Gittell and Vidal 1998; Foley and Edwards 1999) , Empowerment Zones (Riposa 1996) , and "the economic potential of the inner cities" (Porter and Habiby 1999) illustrate variations of this point. These distinctions also reflect "people" and "place" aspects of this shift.
An asset-based approach to public policy addresses different issues and has different implications. Exploring the advantages of the asset-based approach over the need-based approach to community development requires over-time, systematic evidence. A recent U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development assessment of the performance of a sample of Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities suggests promise on several grounds (HUD USER 2001). The assessment found that "significant job growth occurred in four of the six Empowerment Zones and in the six-area total." It also reported that "resident and minority-owned businesses increased substantially across the six zones." These positive findings imply that capitalizing on local assets by involving communities to formulate long-term visions could be potentially successful. This article explores the potential of an assetbased neighborhood redevelopment program on the basis of eight cases that compose a single urban revitalization effort by a municipal government.
᭤ LANI's Background, History, and Precepts
This experience draws on LANI, which helped revitalize eight distressed neighborhoods from 1994 to 1999. LANI grew out of collaboration between the Los Angeles Transit Partnership-an advocacy group that associated the urban ills of Los Angeles with transportation dependency-and the city of Los Angeles. In 1994, the then Mayor Riordan sponsored funding to eight transit-dependent downtown neighborhoods that were selected to participate in a "thirty-month community based demonstration project" (Perkins 1996) . The Federal Transportation Administration provided the LANI funds. Elected officials from sixteen Los Angeles districts applied for LANI funds, and eventually, Boyle Heights, Highland Park, Jefferson Corridor, Leimert Park, North Hollywood, Sun Valley, Vermont Square, and Virgil Village became the program's recipients ( Figure 1 ). LANI has expanded the scope of its assistance to four new areas, including the Fairfax District, the Byzantine-Latino Quarter, Reseda Village, and the Vernon Central Historic District since 1997 and SoRo Village since 2000. However, this article focuses exclusively on the experiences of the eight neighborhoods that were initially accepted into the LANI program.
The selected neighborhoods are culturally and ethnically diverse. Leimert Park, Jefferson Corridor, and Vermont Square have predominantly African American populations, whereas Boyle Heights, Virgil Village, Sun Valley, and Highland Park are predominantly Latino and North Hollywood has largely white inhabitants (Table 1) .
Needy neighborhoods typically suffer from economic problems coupled with physical deterioration, weak social networks, and low citizen participation in the planning process. On the basis of "triage" (Baer 1976; Agnew 1984) , LANI organizers set up specific criteria to ensure the selection of the "right" neighborhoods. Need was not the only criterion. The LANI board members set out to select neighborhoods with critical masses of social and physical assets. To do so, LANI examined the neighborhoods' existing social organizations, geographic boundaries, and physical appearance. Attention to these preconditions helped LANI jump-start the main streets and institutionalize citizens' participation during the planning processes in their neighborhoods. LANI outlined three distinct but interrelated precepts for the long-term capacity building of its designated communities.
Community Participation
Neighborhoods established representative ad hoc organizations or recognized community organizations (RCOs) that addressed their needs as well as future visions. Council offices either selected the RCO members directly or, as in the case of Virgil Village, engaged the local communities in the selection process. Capitalizing on local social assets, RCOs were predominantly the outgrowths of community-based organizations. For example, the North Hollywood Chamber of Commerce, the Virgil Village Rampart Rangers (a neighborhood watch group), and the Boyle Heights Barrio Planners (a local nonprofit planning and architectural firm) evolved into RCOs. With the blessings of the elected officials, LANI helped the new ad hoc committees selforganize. The RCOs' main responsibilities included making financial and management decisions on behalf of each neighborhood. The RCOs' cohesiveness, histories, and community standing were critical factors in executing their decisions. Cohesiveness illustrates the level of partnership among the community groups: What groups were in place, and how did they work together? Were they competitive or factious? Did they work together congenially, even if they represented autonomous groups? On the other hand, the RCOs' histories provided information regarding their 386 Arefi 
Streetscape Improvement
RCOs developed work plans or wish lists that contained communities' detailed visions and how to accomplish them. These documents-or, according to an interviewee, "patterns of hopes"-outlined the nature of improvements with quick visibility, for example, installing trees, streetlights, bus shelters, banners, and pocket parks.
Building Sustainable Community Organizations
The third stage-capacity building-envisioned RCOs evolving into permanent community development corporations and collaborating with outside funding agencies. As a viable component of a successful community development strategy, the last stage ensured long-lasting community participation beyond LANI's involvement in each area. While LANI mandated specific steps to ensure capacity building, the revitalization outcomes varied widely among LANI areas. LANI's community organizing principles resemble Glickman and Servon's (1998) capacity-building framework involving "resource, organizational, network, programmatic, and political" components. Defined as such, it implies the ability to attract, manage, and maintain funding and emphasizes leadership development, technical skills, and residents' involvement in the planning process. Observations of LANI areas revealed signs of capacity building in some, but only modest change in others.
᭤ Method
The research method was purely inductive and not based on hypothesis testing. The study had two data sources. The primary data source comprised twenty-nine in-depth interviews with individuals who knew LANI intimately. Interviewees included RCO members from each community, city officials, and LANI board members. These interviews, which lasted between 45 and 120 minutes and uncovered views ranging from support to opposition, reflected the opinions of local business owners, lawyers, planners, architects, post office employees, community activists, and politicians on the LANI process. To contact individuals who had opposing opinions about LANI, the "snowball sampling" technique was used (Patton 1987) . Former LANI board and RCO members were identified, contacted, and interviewed. Interviews consisted of semistructured, open-ended questions about pre-and post-LANI neighborhood change; they were audiotaped and partially transcribed.
The small number of interviewees made it imperative to adopt a qualitative method by seeking the key informants' indepth views about the LANI-led improvements in each neighborhood. Unlike the quantitative approach, which lends itself to statistical generalizations, the qualitative method based on a small number of neighborhoods in a single-city case study has limited generalizability. However, it provided rich, in-depth information about the interviewees' perceptions of LANI. The study limitations justify future research using larger samples and locational variations. Future research on multiple-city and multiple-neighborhood case studies would more definitively reveal whether modest investments in neighborhoods with certain doses of physical and social capital have merits for capacity building.
To partially rectify the small number of interviewees, the RCO members participated in a mailed opinion survey questionnaire concerning the impact of LANI on their neighborhoods. The questionnaire focused on the implementation of the LANI projects, the nature of physical and social changes, and neighborhood image. On the basis of the LANI directory, containing the names and addresses of neighborhood RCO members, eighty-three questionnaires were mailed, fifty-five of which (seven per neighborhood on average) were completed and returned. This was not a large sample size, but as cross-sections of involved communities, RCO members had intimate familiarity with LANI, and their input was invaluable to this research.
In some cases, the original RCOs either disbanded or stopped meeting when LANI set out to jump-start other neighborhoods. Therefore, contacting the original RCO members became increasingly difficult, if not impossible. After mailing the questionnaire to both current and original RCO members' addresses, for reasons including unavailability, changes of address, deaths, and other unanticipated factors, the survey questionnaire was used only to check the validity of the emergent patterns from in-depth interviews.
Special emphasis was placed on the interviewees' perceptions of the revitalization process on the basis of LANI's main precepts (community involvement, streetscape improvement, and sustainable community organizations). By examining the LANI precepts through "cross-case" comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989, 540) , three distinct patterns of similarities and differences emerged: consensus building, image building, and capacity building. These patterns captured variations of the LANI-led revitalization outcomes. On one level, these patterns were associated with sociopolitical and neighborhood dynamics within which RCOs made their decisions. Yet on another level, these patterns reflected local synergies that were either conducive to or preventive of building new capacities. For example, in-depth interviews detected community-based consensus as "trust and reciprocity" (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993) in North Hollywood and Sun Valley but revealed intensified social cleavages or "structural holes" (Burt 1992) in Virgil Village and Highland Park.
Similarly, in-depth interviews captured nuances of the image-building stage in LANI neighborhoods. Indeed, such variations reflected the extent to which local RCOs built community consensus. High-visibility improvements (e.g., the new parks or plazas in North Hollywood and Boyle Heights) demonstrated broad-based community consensus, whereas thinly spread, less tangible improvements in Virgil Village were indicative of the difficulties in the consensus-building process. The shared vision in the communities that reached consensus reflected a sense of belonging to the whole neighborhood, whereas in the areas with marginal consensus, self-seeking behavior prevailed. In such areas, the absence of any collective vision prevented the residents from targeting resources on locations with high visibility. Instead, they preferred spreading resources thinly across the neighborhood.
These variations among the three categories emerged from the in-depth interviews. The questionnaire, however, served as a secondary source that helped confirm those findings. Tables  2, 3 , and 4 illustrate how the information elicited from the questionnaires matched cross-case comparisons derived from the interviews. Table 2 , for example, operationalizes consensus building in terms of RCOs' current attendance rates and frequencies, the last time they met in the past two years, and the number of friends RCO members had in their neighborhoods. It is also important to note that the neighborhood rankings were consistent with the data collected from the interviews. For example, while the Virgil Village RCO stopped meeting long before this research started, the North Hollywood and Sun Valley RCOs met regularly. The data allowed a cross-case comparison of the neighborhoods' consensus-building processes. Similar methods were used to operationalize image building and capacity building. The next section discusses the asset-based approach to community development against the backdrop of two putative community development programs. (2) yes (1) Activity (3) yes (0) no (1) neutral Boundary (2) yes (1) no Highland Park
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᭤ Asset-Building, LANI, Model Cities, and Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Zone Programs
The dual attention to community "needs" and "assets" created mutual expectations between LANI and the neighborhoods. By providing the neighborhoods with "seed money" and technical assistance, LANI expected them to capitalize on their assets and organize. In exchange for complying with LANI mandates and receiving funds, the power to implement projects, and know-how, the RCOs were expected to build new capacities. Initially, LANI promised that each neighborhood would receive up to $10 million but provided them with only $250,000. The sheer presence of LANI and its monetary promise created expectations that persisted throughout its involvement in these communities. Initially, elected officials and RCOs expressed feelings of "gratitude," whereas later, they expressed "disappointment" at LANI's breach of its initial promise. A LANI board member stated that a councilperson "was totally let down" (personal interview 1999).
The tension between "gratefulness" and "entitlement" created "confusion" that came from the LANI board. A Jefferson Park RCO member described this confusion as a result of an "evolving, changing program, which began with a ridiculous amount of dollars to work with, then . . . kept getting smaller to the point where we say are we gonna have money to do anything?" (personal interview 1999). According to a Highland Park RCO member, "Everybody was thinking $8 million; what are we going to do with our eight, seven, or six million dollars?" (personal interview 1999). For a Virgil Village RCO member, this news was a "big shock" insofar as "40 percent of our budget went to administrative expenses" (personal interview 1999). This sudden disenchantment of the selected areas with LANI funds added to the importance of an asset-based revitalization approach.
Generally, community assets embody tangible and intangible components. Tangible physical assets include parks, roads, buildings, and public space, while intangible assets include mainly formal or informal social networks, for example, chambers of commerce or grassroots neighborhood organizations. While LANI considered transit dependency as a specific "need," emphasis was placed on neighborhoods' "assets," that is, existing stocks of social capital and physical capital, as part of the selection criteria. RCOs, for example, evolved from the local chambers of commerce or the Young Men's Christian Association branches. Similarly, attention was paid to the "basic features of a neighborhood main street" 1 supported existing community organizations, project management, leadership training, business stimulus programs, technical assistance, and youth development programs.
The combination of perceived needs and assets in assisting languishing communities made the LANI approach somewhat different when compared to other community development programs. Table 5 compares LANI with two other well-known community development programs: the Model Cities programs of the 1960s and 1970s and the Empowerment Zone and Enterprise Zone programs of the 1990s.
The three programs were neighborhood based, received federal funds, and embarked on "people prosperity" through "place prosperity." LANI communities translated their needs and assets into a set of people-and place-based tasks and oversaw the planning and implementation processes. Notable in this comparison, however, is the shift of emphasis from the predominantly need-based view of the Model Cities programs to the more asset-based focuses of the Empowerment Zone programs and LANI. Although the majority of LANI areas had higher rates of transit dependency and poverty, lower annual household income, and a greater percentage of the population driving cars compared to the Los Angeles means, particular attention was paid to local assets (Table 6) .
Unlike the Model Cities and the Empowerment Zone programs, LANI had a limited budget. As a catalytic program, LANI funds served as "seed money" for implementing quick and visible improvements. Capitalizing on neighborhoods' assets and the seed money-LANI expected-would enable them to leverage additional dollars fairly quickly. LANI defined short term as the duration of the completion of projects within twelve to twenty-four months. This point highlights LANI's catalytic role compared to the Model Cities and Empowerment Zone programs.
The three programs also differed from one another in terms of the unintended consequences they produced. For example, the Model Cities programs suffered from conflicts between residents and mayors over who would maintain control over political and financial resources. Thus, maximum feasible participation resulted in the "maximum feasible misunderstanding" (Moynihan 1969) . Conversely, the LANI constituencies and their elected officials generally shared power and responsibility in making planning decisions. The factionalist nature of Virgil Village and Highland Park, however, intensified rather than narrowed social and ethnic divides in these two LANI neighborhoods. The manifestation of such cleavages, or what Burt (1992) calls "structural holes," requires that conflict resolution strategies be employed prior to implementing physical improvements in those areas. Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Zones produced "relatively expensive" jobs that "attracted mainly branch plants 
᭤ Emergent Patterns
Three categories emerged from the open-ended interviews with informants. On one hand, these themes (consensus building, image building, and capacity building) reflected the policy tensions discussed at the outset. On the other hand, they reflected the cross-case patterns based on the LANI precepts of participation, streetscape improvement, and long-term economic and social vitality. These categories capture the variations on the degree to which they complied with the LANI mandates. For example, community involvement, LANI's first precept, was not fully achieved in all neighborhoods. Virgil Village and Highland Park faced more problems than other areas in reaching community consensus over shortand long-term improvements. Image building proved equally challenging for some areas as well. In turn, the degree of success in these two stages determined the potential for the third stage, namely, long-term capacity building.
Consensus building results in social cohesion and mirrors the ability to build social ties. Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti (1993) call these ties "bonding capital." As a generic form of social capital, bonding capital shares the common features of capital: investment and returns (Bates 1990) . "Social trust" and "norms of reciprocity" (Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993) arise with investment in social relations. Networks of "civic engagement" and "norms of reciprocity" become returns to such investments and create opportunities to leverage contacts' resources and the ability to act collectively. Networks typically revolve around informal interactions and membership in associations. RCO members who met regularly to resolve their differences on neighborhood issues developed trust in one another, and through norms of reciprocity, they encountered fewer problems in making unanimous decisions. They identified their future goals and ways of obtaining them more easily than in those RCOs with limited social capital, factionalism, and rising social tensions. Burt (1992) calls this phenomenon a "structural hole." Under these circumstances, communities "must create structures that work to overcome mistrust and isolation and so create essential social capital" (Gruber 1994, 10) .
The second category, image building, transcends physical improvement in that its importance lies in restoring a sense of community and pride. A community's general image in part reflects its existing physical and social capital and partly how it is viewed from outside. Many if not all of the LANI neighborhoods suffered from the pervasive stigmas of downtown Los Angeles and its multiple images of poverty, deviant behavior, crime, immigrant populations, and the core of the city's civil unrest. As such, rectifying this imagery proved quite challenging. Sun Valley's industrial character, Boyle Heights's characterization as East Los Angeles, and Vermont Square and Jefferson Corridor's association with South Central Los Angeles exemplify prevalent stigmas in these areas. These negative images emerged as a recurrent problem time and again during the interviews. As a consequence of these preexisting stigmas, sustaining redevelopment activities in LANI communities required extensive image-building efforts. Leimert Park, Boyle Heights, and Jefferson made significant headway by capitalizing on their rich cultural, ethnic heritage and social values.
Finally, capacity building became feasible not only when the revitalization outcome integrated the welfare of people and places but also when the social image was restored. Neighborhoods that pursued one goal without considering any others failed to build new capacities. North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, and Sun Valley improved the appearance of their neighborhoods and enhanced their images, while other neighborhoods still need to make concerted efforts to accomplish a range of financial, managerial, and organizational objectives. Capacity building manifests itself in increased investment possibilities, networking and grant writing, and forging public-private partnerships. It will be shown shortly how these areas leveraged their resources with outside funding. Seen thus, capacity building becomes a useful concept that draws from assets and needs on one hand and the people and place prosperity nexus on the other. Source: U.S. Census Bureau (1990) .
Consensus Building
Consensus building emerged as a critical issue in how LANI communities participated in the decision-making process. North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, Leimert Park, and Sun Valley, thanks to their stronger social networks, participated more vigorously than Virgil Village and Highland Park in the planning process. The absence of shared social and economic goals, coupled with ethnic and cultural differences, created major obstacles toward the long-term viability of the latter communities. A small number of RCO members asserted that LANI paid insufficient attention to reconciling and resolving tensions in neighborhoods with long-standing ethnic and racial differences. The LANI opinion survey questionnaire confirmed this point. While 50 percent of respondents viewed racial sensitivity as "high," 30 percent perceived it as "low" in their neighborhoods. The LANI executive director recognized the "need for consensus building at the beginning of the process" (personal interview 1999). Thus, the LANI process intensified rather than ameliorated the existing sociocultural and ethnic cleavages in such areas. For example, in Highland Park, the process had adverse effects on the entire revitalization process. Recalling moments when people walked out of community meetings, a Highland Park RCO member maintained that it was difficult because we had to organize ourselves as an organization, and then we had to get to know each other and then we had to pull out a plan-all within a short amount of time. And we didn't have any real guidance to it.
The Highland Park RCO chair expected LANI to serve as a "facilitator" in a neighborhood where "everybody was kind of distrustful of each other and no one knew each other." To effectively work out the differences among RCO members, he emphasized the importance of consensus building up front and "at the beginning." It is possible that weak local leadership also contributed to the lack of consensus. Even after the Highland Park RCO hired and fired its project manager several times, problems still persisted. This is consistent with the LANI director's characterization of Highland Park as a contested area among three groups:
one that wanted to see the Figueroa Corridor another Pasadena Old Town; another group wanted this area revitalized but preserved for our immigrant businesses. Then there was the issue of the adjacent Blue Line coming. Some were for, some were against and when LANI came in as a transportation-oriented project into this very factious community, they had to establish themselves, as we are not pro or con. (See Arefi 2002, 106.) Virgil Village faced similar conflicts. Historical class and ethnic rifts, coupled with distinct physical and geographic divisions, increased neighborhood factionalism. According to the Virgil Village RCO chair, "You suddenly recognize the fact that there are certain long-standing differences between certain people and it's hard to work past that. So, you have to keep working on the bigger picture." But working on the bigger picture has not been easy, especially in the absence of "trust" and "reciprocity" among various ethnic groups that do not communicate, as the following illustrates:
The problem is that so many of these businesses are sole proprietorships with immigrant background and it is so diverse; you have Philippinos, Chinese, Koreans, Salvadorians, Guatemalans, Mexicans; they are all coexisting next to each other and they don't really talk to each other.
Describing the chasm between residents and local merchants, the Virgil Village RCO chair asserted that "they [merchants] haven't helped us for five years; why should we help them? This is all the pushing and pulling that you have been having all along here." He also described the "rivalry" between the mayor's office, residents, and the local elected official concerning a soccer field, stating that "the mayor's office . . . tried to negotiate a deal and they sort of blew their cover and with the developer who owned the property and he is . . . trying to squeeze the city for as much as he can."
The planning literature has recognized the importance of consensus building (Innes 1994; Innes and Booher 1997) . Consensus implies "shared interest" and agreement among various actors and stakeholders to induce collective action. This is particularly important in Virgil Village and Highland Park, where according to the LANI executive director, residents are "distrustful and cynical of the public programs" (personal interview 1999). But it seems simplistic to think that LANI could have resolved long-standing ethnic and social differences among local businesses and residents on one hand and the RCO members and the city or elected officials on the other-especially in thirty months.
Indeed, the critique of the Highland Park RCO member about LANI's emphasis on physical improvement in the absence of consensus building underscores the need for detecting local social capital early on during the neighborhood selection process. Identifying "specified individuals or classes of individuals [who] can be trusted" (Coleman 1990 ) to assume local leadership will institutionalize trust and reciprocity as a way to provide the community with "crucial resources." Trustworthy individuals serving as local leaders can mobilize the social resources by facilitating communications among different factions who would otherwise not get along with one another. According to Ostrom (1997) , social capital increases with use rather than with "disuse." The ability of individuals to collaborate and make decisions should therefore contribute to the expansion of social capital.
Notwithstanding the importance of social capital in consensus formation, other factors (e.g., local leadership) facilitated or hindered consensus building in the LANI areas. North Hollywood is a case in point in which the RCO chair developed external linkages and ties with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) and other outside financial organizations. Strong leadership helped the North Hollywood RCO members develop trust and reach consensus. The same can be said about Sun Valley and its outstanding RCO leadership. In fact, given the initial modest stock of physical capital in Sun Valley and its "perpetual" dirtiness, combined with wide and uninviting streets, the results achieved there attest to its substantial RCO leadership, which consequently led to both strong community consensus and the timely implementation of LANI projects.
Jefferson Corridor and Leimert Park also bridged their social gaps ("structural holes"), which could have otherwise resulted in a reversal of the entire redevelopment process. They have made strides in consensus building despite earlier signs that suggested rising conflict and dissension. The information collected from the questionnaires confirmed interviewees' concerns. Questions contained in the survey included the current attendance of RCO members, the last time respondents attended RCO meetings, how often they met, and the people they knew and considered friends in their areas. The results revealed additional information on the nature of consensus building in each neighborhood.
Responses to these questions as proxies for consensus show its nuances among different RCOs. In some cases, deviant answers to factual questions (such as RCO meeting schedules) represent low consensus levels. As Table 2 shows, North Hollywood, Sun Valley, Vermont Square, and Leimert Park scored better than the other locations in this regard.
Image Building LANI started with the premise that modest physical improvements would not only help beautify blighted neighborhoods but would also help empower the citizens residing in those areas. This explains LANI's emphasis on beautification. In the LANI lexicon, "visible," "catalytic" improvements along neighborhood main streets would encourage people to take ownership in their communities' public spaces and would foster a sense of pride. The LANI community work plans outlined a series of catalytic improvements that would ensure quick results with high visibility. Conceivably, visible physical upgrading could help restore a sense of pride and could serve as a catalyst for leveraging resources through public-private partnerships. Acknowledging the willingness of the residents to shop in an area if the street was safer and the stores carried a higher quality of goods, and by addressing this "catch-22 cycle," the LANI work plans recognized the importance of image building in economic vitality.
Although simplistic at first glance, the image-building process proved complicated in practice. Indeed, the dilemma was to either spend improvement funds thinly but evenly across the entire main street or focus on beautifying strategic and visible locations (e.g., neighborhood intersections). Neighborhoods with social conflicts consented less to a concentration of LANI funds on local "eyesores" (e.g., vacant lands), opting instead to spread the funds evenly across the project area. Such improvements primarily included street furniture. When consensus was feasible, RCOs leveraged LANI funds with outside sources to maximize visual impacts. North Hollywood's Arts Park is a case in point. The third group, including Leimert Park and Jefferson Corridor, used a mixed strategy and implemented neighborhood-wide as well as more visible improvements, namely, parks and plazas. Although it turned out that the areas that chose the latter option achieved greater visibility than areas that spread improvements evenly along the main street, a more pervasive problem emerged and mediated the redevelopment efforts; that is to say that social stigmas were exacerbated.
As mentioned, strong social stigmas beset all of the LANI areas. These stigmas undermined part of the revitalization efforts in some areas. LANI areas suffered from disinvestment, redlining, and long-standing public stigmas. Any attempt to revitalize these communities was unequivocally interlinked with restoring this image. Neighborhood beautification of the main streets was a means to that end. Pernicious stigmas associated with these areas offset part of the restored confidence fostered by the LANI catalytic improvements. For example, the stigma of South Central Los Angeles has created a sizable untapped market in the area. According to a former LANI board member, a report from the Urban Land Institute estimated that there was about "$1 billion worth of purchasing power" around Vermont Square in 1993 (telephone interview 1999). The Vermont Square RCO chair describes the stigma associated with its location:
[Investors] look at one thing [location] instead of looking at the people in the community . . . what they are doing they are putting you in a box. They intend to keep you in that box . . . . This Vermont Square. It is not South Central. It is easy to give people bad reputation. (See Arefi 2002, 107.) A local newspaper article reflected the RCO chair's viewpoints about Vermont Square in an article entitled "This Is Not South Central!" In that article, the chair asserted that "if you want to say South Central, that is South East. We don't want to be any more, but we don't want to be any less either. We are Vermont Square." A Leimert Park RCO member also criticized how newspapers portrayed it "in such a negative light" as possessing a concentration of the "people of color."
Jefferson Corridor and Leimert Park made some efforts, however, to rid themselves of their negative images. A community once plagued by violence, drug dealers, and graffiti, Jefferson Corridor beautified and renamed the area. A Jefferson Corridor RCO member attributed this effort to three pastors who got together more than ten years ago in "an area infested with litter and trash, graffiti; soon after followed the naming ceremony." Ever since, the community has celebrated the renaming of the area with a community parade and festivities every January in the park. Looking for support, the newly founded group then "decided to beautify the area as a means to boost civic prides and confidence."
The initial physical condition of Sun Valley-according to its RCO chair, who was born and raised there-was not any better than other neighborhoods; "graffiti" and "vandalism" were rampant. "Sunland Boulevard and San Fernando Road was listed as one of the one hundred worst intersections in the State of California" (personal interview, 1998). LANI improvements served as catalysts for physical and social transformation of the conditions described earlier. For example, the "shared vision" surrounding the image of "an African American cultural center" enabled Leimert Park residents and businesspeople to positively transform the community's social image too.
As discussed previously, physical improvement strategies varied from neighborhood to neighborhood. North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, Leimert Park, and Sun Valley took advantage of the opportunity provided by LANI to restore positive cultural image. North Hollywood fancied a recreational hub that would host jazz festivals and different cultural festivities year round; for Boyle Heights, the Mariachi Plaza reflected the community's rich Latino heritage; Leimert Park has become the quintessential hub of the African American culture in Los Angeles. Sun Valley's RCO converted a vacant piece of land into a community pocket park. Improvements in North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, and Sun Valley achieved more short-term visibility in comparison to other areas. The transformation of a local eyesore into an arts park at the intersection of Lankershim and Magnolia in North Hollywood illustrates this point:
Consensus was [that] they wanted to do something about the corner of Magnolia and Lankershim . . . it looked the most doggy of the world-a junky lot. And it made sense for us as a group and fortunately the community felt the same way; hence the Arts Park was born. (See Arefi 2002, 108.) The Boyle Heights RCO chair discusses the image-building process:
All we had to do is knock down the building [what used to be a huge two story building] and the police parking extended all the way to the corner and now all the crime is gone . . . . With crime gone, now the rest of the community is thriving and there is a kind of an insurrection going on. (See Arefi 2002, 107.) In addition to the interviews, the questionnaires included questions on image building (Table 3) . Especially, the perception of positive physical conditions would result in increased use of public space and an improved image of the area. Hence, changes in the number of neighborhood social events, places respondents and their friends got together in the neighborhood, and emotional attachments to and feelings about the area prior to and after LANI were compared and ranked. Table 3 summarizes the questionnaire responses on neighborhood image. On the basis of these data, respondents' feelings toward their neighborhoods were rated and added up to determine the overall score for each neighborhood. The difference between the two scores-feelings before and during LANI-determined the final ranking for each neighborhood. The mean of the values attributed to feelings of loyalty, neighborhood boundaries, and particular activities in each area also accounted for part of their overall rankings. On the basis of this evaluation, it is possible to group these areas in the following descending order: Leimert Park, Boyle Heights, Virgil Village, North Hollywood, Vermont Square, Sun Valley, Jefferson Corridor, and Highland Park. This ranking is similar to how LANI board members initially envisaged existing physical capital in each area. As can be seen, Virgil Village portrays fairly high physical capital thanks to its narrow streets, definite geographic boundary, and "small-town feel," as a former LANI board member asserted (personal interview, 1998) .
Capacity Building
On the basis of sociological thought, it is conceivable to view neighborhoods as organizations. Once viewed as such, useful concepts, including interdependence, internal and external linkages, and resources, come to mind (Turk 1977) . Organizations shape our public life. Our neighborhoods and communities also typically comprise numerous organizations, including churches, schools, sports clubs, and the like. As discussed earlier, LANI took this important facet of contemporary life into consideration as part of its neighborhood selection criteria. LANI initially identified existing organizations in each of the designated communities. Over time, these neighborhood-wide organizations developed internal and external linkages of some sort with the community or broader social context. Eventually, it was the robustness and strength of these linkages that helped transform them-irrespective of whether or not they leveraged their resources with outside funders.
As (macro) social units, neighborhoods establish internal (community-wide) and external or extralocal linkages. These linkages vary widely on the basis of not only size, scale, and complexity but also "linkage availability" (Turk 1977 ). Turk shows that "the greater the availability of internal linkage for the macrosocial unit, the more likely is interorganizational activation" (p. 137). The key here is the relationship between internal and external linkages and the resources available to the (macro) social unit, that is, a neighborhood. On the basis of this corollary, it is possible to compare the performance of LANI neighborhoods with respect to the last stage of the redevelopment continuum-leveraging public-private partnerships (capacity building). The results clearly indicate why North Hollywood, Leimert Park, and Boyle Heights leveraged their resources with strong external linkages more effectively than the other neighborhoods.
This assessment stresses the role social capital plays in establishing internal and external linkages of the neighborhoods on one hand and their locational advantages (or disadvantages) on the other. Data from the questionnaires also revealed additional information about capacity building in each neighborhood. These questions focused on the neighborhood RCOs' collaboration track records, their forging of partnerships, and the amount of dollars leveraged. In each example, these answers suggest that North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, and Leimert Park leveraged more dollars than Sun Valley, Highland Park, Jefferson Corridor, Vermont Square, and Virgil Village. The North Hollywood RCO chair described the formation of a successful partnership that brought together the community redevelopment agency (CRA) and the private sector for the maintenance of Arts Park:
We wanted to have a way of maintaining it [Arts Park] . . . we expanded the lease agreement . . . . We negotiated to lease with the CRA because it was the CRA property . . . . So what they did is they leased it to us. We did the Arts Park and then put an RFP [request for proposal] for what we thought was a coffee cart at that point in time. The Deluxe Catering answered the RFP and they answered it from the standpoint of could we use the park as an adjunct if we developed a restaurant next door? The agreement was that they would lease it; they would keep the upkeep and everything else . . . . We expanded on the lease agreement . . . . Our initial investment was about $80,000 total; they came in and put another $60,000 into it; actually made the park a gathering site with their patio. That turned out to be an excellent partnership because it involves the private, it involves the CRA; it involves our group by itself. The whole thing sits around a bus stop and one of the busiest transit lines in the MTA. That thing really clicked.
The Boyle Heights RCO chair associates the "insurrection" of the area with the attraction of new businesses to the area. The following illustrates this point:
[Businesses] are investing nearly half a million dollars to do a new restaurant; and a lot of people have completely changed the Mariachi Plaza area. There is no vacancies, there was a lot of little mom and pop stuff . . . now we have people like Numero Uno that want to come in, because the area is nicer looking now, people have built apartment houses. (See Arefi 2002, 107.) 
᭤ Lessons for Planners
The study offers two planning lessons: the first one suggests a continuum along which capacity building could occur. On the basis of this continuum, "consensus building" precedes "image building," and subsequently, "capacity building" follows image building. The personal interviews and the data collected from the questionnaires suggest that even though LANI mandated the establishment of the RCOs and instructed them to develop work plans, it placed less emphasis on consensus building ("bonding capital"). The mere formation of RCOs did not guarantee consensus building. Problems in Highland Park and Virgil Village confirmed this point. Second, image building calls for physical improvement once a consensus is reached. Jefferson Corridor and Sun Valley illustrated this point. Finally, long-term capacity building-as the last stage of the continuum-followed consensus building and image building. North Hollywood, Boyle Heights, and Leimert Park leveraged their resources with outside funding sources following the previous stages.
On the basis of this continuum, it is possible to rank LANI neighborhoods as high, medium, and low with respect to consensus building, image building, and capacity building. As an offshoot of the first lesson, the second planning lesson concerns asset building, thus extending Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti's (1993) contribution to social capital and its significance for community economic development. Although not definitive, the cross-case comparisons of LANI neighborhoods confirmed the complementarity of physical capital and social capital (Arefi 2002) . While both display the main components of capacity building, neither singly meets all the criteria for neighborhood revitalization. Similarly, in what they called the "architecture of engagement, " Bothwell, Gindroz, and Lang (1998) explored the role of local "spatial design" principles in producing social capital.
It is possible to divide the LANI areas into three subgroups with respect to the social capital-physical capital nexus. The first group of neighborhoods includes those with inadequate amounts of physical or social capital. For example, reliance on social capital alone did not help Vermont Square revitalize. The pervasive stigma of South Central Los Angeles associated with Vermont Square counteracted its social capital stock and played an important part in its inability to leverage additional dollars. Hence, leveraging resources in Vermont Square requires extensive physical capital or "image-building" efforts. Neighborhoods with some physical capital and little social capital did not show redevelopment promise either. In the absence of a critical mass of social capital, physical capital alone (e.g., narrow, pedestrian-friendly streets; architectural, cultural, and historical significance) proved inadequate in the case of Virgil Village and Highland Park in the sense that these areas were unable to leverage additional dollars. Indeed, marginal stocks of social capital in both cases offset the efforts to sustain revitalization efforts.
The second group represents neighborhoods with a critical mass of both social and physical capital stocks, that is, Jefferson Corridor, Sun Valley, and Leimert Park. Jefferson Corridor promoted image building by hosting annual local parades and celebrating its naming ceremony. These efforts helped Jefferson Corridor alleviate the South Central Los Angeles stigma. In Sun Valley, the RCO leadership managed successfully to improve the community image by leveraging local resources with outside funds. Planting new trees, general landscaping, and other physical improvements enhanced Sun Valley's sense of place and pride. These efforts helped the area partially offset the stigma associated with its industrial, nonresidential character. Leimert Park made similar attempts to capitalize on its unique African American heritage. Leimert Park's annual jazz festivals and cultural events, including Kwanzaa, are cases in point.
The third group of neighborhoods with high doses of social and physical assets leveraged resources with outside funds. Capacity building in North Hollywood manifested itself in the leasing of the new park and plaza space to professional office buildings in the area, as well as partnering with public and private agencies. Hence, both social capital and physical capital stocks contributed to capacity building in North Hollywood. Table 7 summarizes the need-asset dichotomy, the relevant concepts, and the emergent categories from the LANI experience.
Essentially, the categories that emerged out of the LANI experience offer three lessons to planners who seek to revitalize struggling neighborhoods. The LANI initiative illustrates how (1) consensus building, (2) image building, and (3) capacity building are integral to citizens' involvement in the planning process. Such a process could increase a neighborhood's economic vitality, as well as restore its sense of civic pride. 
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